<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>Security, bugs &amp; vulnerabilities on Varnish Cache</title><link>https://www.varnish.org/docs/security/</link><description>Recent content in Security, bugs &amp; vulnerabilities on Varnish Cache</description><generator>Hugo</generator><language>en-us</language><lastBuildDate>Mon, 16 Mar 2026 00:00:00 +0000</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://www.varnish.org/docs/security/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>VSV00001 DoS vulnerability</title><link>https://www.varnish.org/docs/security/vsv00001/</link><pubDate>Mon, 16 Mar 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://www.varnish.org/docs/security/vsv00001/</guid><description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;a id="vsv00001"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2017-12425"&gt;CVE-2017-12425&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Date: 2017-08-02&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A wrong if statement in the varnishd source code means that
particular invalid requests from the client can trigger an assert.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This causes the varnishd worker process to abort and restart, loosing
the cached contents in the process.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An attacker can therefore crash the varnishd worker process on
demand and effectively keep it from serving content - a Denial-of-Service
attack.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Mitigation is possible from VCL or by updating to a fixed version
of Varnish Cache.&lt;/p&gt;</description></item><item><title>VSV00002 Data leak - ‘-sfile’ Stevedore transient objects</title><link>https://www.varnish.org/docs/security/vsv00002/</link><pubDate>Mon, 16 Mar 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://www.varnish.org/docs/security/vsv00002/</guid><description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;a id="vsv00002"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2017-8807"&gt;CVE-2017-8807&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Date: 2017-11-15&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A wrong if statement in the varnishd source code means that synthetic
objects in stevedores which over-allocate, may leak up to page size of
data from a malloc(3) memory allocation.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In a unpredictable percentage of the cases where this condition
arises, a segmentation fault will happen instead.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;All the following conditions are required to trigger the problem:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;A -sfile or -spersistent stevedore must be configured&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;A synthetic object must be created in vcl_backend_error{}&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;The synthetic object ends up in the file or persistent stevedore.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;
&lt;p&gt;For the third condition can arise in two different ways:&lt;/p&gt;</description></item><item><title>VSV00003 DoS attack vector</title><link>https://www.varnish.org/docs/security/vsv00003/</link><pubDate>Mon, 16 Mar 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://www.varnish.org/docs/security/vsv00003/</guid><description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;a id="vsv00003"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2019-15892"&gt;CVE-2019-15892&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Date: 2019-09-03&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An HTTP/1 parsing failure has been uncovered in Varnish Cache that will
allow a remote attacker to trigger an assert in Varnish Cache by sending
specially crafted HTTP/1 requests. The assert will cause Varnish to
automatically restart with a clean cache, which makes it a Denial of
Service attack.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The problem was uncovered by internal testing at Varnish Software. It has
to the best of our knowledge not been exploited.&lt;/p&gt;</description></item><item><title>VSV00003 DoS attack vector VCL mitigation</title><link>https://www.varnish.org/docs/security/vsv00003-mitigation/</link><pubDate>Mon, 16 Mar 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://www.varnish.org/docs/security/vsv00003-mitigation/</guid><description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;a id="vsv00003-mitigation"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Date: 2019-09-03&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The issue documented in &lt;a href="https://www.varnish.org/docs/security/vsv00003/#vsv00003"&gt;VSV00003&lt;/a&gt; can be mitigated from
VCL where deployment of binary fixes is not possible immediately.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;We provide two methods of mitigation, one simple with a performance
impact, and one more complex method which can avoid the performance
impact, but may also need to the fall back to it.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2 id="simple-mitigation"&gt;Simple mitigation&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The simple mitigation method is to not use HTTP/1 keepalive connections by
setting the Connection: close header of the client response, which is
respected by varnish in that it closes the connection after all of the
response body has been sent.&lt;/p&gt;</description></item><item><title>VSV00004 Workspace information leak</title><link>https://www.varnish.org/docs/security/vsv00004/</link><pubDate>Mon, 16 Mar 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://www.varnish.org/docs/security/vsv00004/</guid><description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;a id="vsv00004"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2019-20637"&gt;CVE-2019-20637&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Date: 2019-10-21&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A bug has been discovered in Varnish Cache where we fail to clear a
pointer between the handling of one client requests and the next on the
same connection. This can under specific circumstances lead to information
being leaked from the connection workspace.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The impact is an information leak, limited to the data in the workspace
used for handling the connection. This will typically be data structures
and stale header data from previous requests on the same connection, but
could also be temporary headers set during processing of VCL.&lt;/p&gt;</description></item><item><title>VSV00005 Varnish HTTP Proxy Protocol V2 Denial of Service</title><link>https://www.varnish.org/docs/security/vsv00005/</link><pubDate>Mon, 16 Mar 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://www.varnish.org/docs/security/vsv00005/</guid><description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;a id="vsv00005"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2020-11653"&gt;CVE-2020-11653&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Date: 2020-02-04&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An assert can be triggered in Varnish Cache when using Varnish with a TLS
termination proxy, and the proxy and Varnish use the PROXY version 2
protocol to communicate connection details. Depending on the type of proxy
used and the details it include in the proxy payload, it may be possible
for remote clients to cause Varnish to assert and restart, making it a
denial of service attack.&lt;/p&gt;</description></item><item><title>VSV00006 varnish-modules Denial of Service</title><link>https://www.varnish.org/docs/security/vsv00006/</link><pubDate>Mon, 16 Mar 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://www.varnish.org/docs/security/vsv00006/</guid><description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;a id="vsv00006"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2021-28543"&gt;CVE-2021-28543&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Date: 2021-03-16&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An assert or NULL pointer dereference can be triggered in Varnish
Cache through the &lt;code&gt;header.append()&lt;/code&gt; and &lt;code&gt;header.copy()&lt;/code&gt; functions
from the separate varnish-modules bundle, which, depending on
specifics of the Varnish Configuration Language (VCL) file used, might
allow for remote clients to cause Varnish to assert and restart.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A restart reduces overall availability and performance due to an
increased number of cache misses, and may cause higher load on backend
servers.&lt;/p&gt;</description></item><item><title>VSV00007 Varnish HTTP/2 Request Smuggling Attack</title><link>https://www.varnish.org/docs/security/vsv00007/</link><pubDate>Mon, 16 Mar 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://www.varnish.org/docs/security/vsv00007/</guid><description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;a id="vsv00007"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2021-36740"&gt;CVE-2021-36740&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Date: 2021-07-13&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A request smuggling attack can be performed on Varnish Cache and Varnish
Cache Plus servers that have the HTTP/2 protocol enabled. The smuggled
requests do not go through normal VCL processing, and any authorization
steps implemented in VCL would be bypassed.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The responses to the smuggled requests can under some circumstances also
be obtained by the attacker. Also, it may be possible for an attacker to
use this for cache poisoning, where the response to a smuggled request is
inserted as the cached content.&lt;/p&gt;</description></item><item><title>VSV00008 Varnish HTTP/1 Request Smuggling Vulnerability</title><link>https://www.varnish.org/docs/security/vsv00008/</link><pubDate>Mon, 16 Mar 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://www.varnish.org/docs/security/vsv00008/</guid><description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;a id="vsv00008"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2022-23959"&gt;CVE-2022-23959&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Date: 2022-01-25&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A request smuggling attack can be performed on HTTP/1 connections on
Varnish Cache servers. The smuggled request would be treated as an
additional request by the Varnish server, go through normal VCL
processing, and injected as a spurious response on the client connection.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2 id="identifying-smuggled-requests"&gt;Identifying smuggled requests&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Smuggled requests will show in the logs generated by Varnish as normal
requests. It may be possible to identify the smuggled requests by
comparing the Varnish logs with logs from any proxy software between the
Varnish server and the client.&lt;/p&gt;</description></item><item><title>VSV00009 Varnish Denial of Service Vulnerability</title><link>https://www.varnish.org/docs/security/vsv00009/</link><pubDate>Mon, 16 Mar 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://www.varnish.org/docs/security/vsv00009/</guid><description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;a id="vsv00009"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2022-38150"&gt;CVE-2022-38150&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Date: 2022-08-09&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A denial of service attack can be performed against Varnish Cache servers
by specially formatting the reason phrase of the backend response status
line. In order to execute an attack, the attacker would have to be able to
influence the HTTP/1 responses that the Varnish Server receives from its
configured backends. A successful attack would cause the Varnish Server to
assert and automatically restart.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2 id="versions-affected"&gt;Versions affected&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Varnish Cache releases 7.0.0, 7.0.1, 7.0.2, 7.1.0&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;
&lt;h2 id="versions-not-affected"&gt;Versions not affected&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Varnish Cache 7.0.3 (released 2022-08-09)&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Varnish Cache 7.1.1 (released 2022-08-09)&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;All versions of Varnish Cache 6.0 LTS series and Varnish Cache Plus by
Varnish Software.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;GitHub Varnish Cache master branch at commit c5fd097e5cce8b461c6443af02b3448baef2491d&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;
&lt;h2 id="mitigation"&gt;Mitigation&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;If upgrading Varnish is not possible, it is possible to mitigate the
problem by adding the following snippet at the beginning of the
vcl_backend_response VCL function:&lt;/p&gt;</description></item><item><title>VSV00010 Varnish Request Smuggling Vulnerability</title><link>https://www.varnish.org/docs/security/vsv00010/</link><pubDate>Mon, 16 Mar 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://www.varnish.org/docs/security/vsv00010/</guid><description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;a id="vsv00010"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2022-45059"&gt;CVE-2022-45059&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Date: 2022-11-08&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A request smuggling attack can be performed on Varnish Cache servers by
requesting that certain headers are made hop-by-hop, preventing the
Varnish Cache servers from forwarding critical headers to the
backend. Among the headers that can be filtered this way are both
Content-Length and Host, making it possible for an attacker to both
break the HTTP/1 protocol framing, and bypass request to host routing
in VCL.&lt;/p&gt;</description></item><item><title>VSV00011 Varnish HTTP/2 Request Forgery Vulnerability</title><link>https://www.varnish.org/docs/security/vsv00011/</link><pubDate>Mon, 16 Mar 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://www.varnish.org/docs/security/vsv00011/</guid><description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;a id="vsv00011"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2022-45060"&gt;CVE-2022-45060&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Date: 2022-11-08&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A request forgery attack can be performed on Varnish Cache servers that
have the HTTP/2 protocol turned on. An attacker may introduce characters
through the HTTP/2 pseudo-headers that are invalid in the context of an
HTTP/1 request line, causing the Varnish server to produce invalid HTTP/1
requests to the backend. This may in turn be used to successfully exploit
vulnerabilities in a server behind the Varnish server.&lt;/p&gt;</description></item><item><title>VSV00012 Base64 decoding vulnerability in vmod-digest</title><link>https://www.varnish.org/docs/security/vsv00012/</link><pubDate>Mon, 16 Mar 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://www.varnish.org/docs/security/vsv00012/</guid><description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;a id="vsv00012"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2023-41104"&gt;CVE-2023-41104&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Date: 2023-08-17&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A base64 decoding vulnerability has been discovered in vmod-digest.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The potential outcome of the vulnerability can be both authentication
bypass and information disclosure, however the exact attack surface
will depend on the particular VCL configuration in use.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Common usage of vmod-digest is for basic HTTP authentication, in which
case it may be possible for an attacker to circumvent the
authentication check. If the decoded result string is somehow being
made visible to the attacker (for example the result of the decoding
is added to a response header), then there is the potential for
information disclosure from reading out of band workspace data.&lt;/p&gt;</description></item><item><title>VSV00013 Varnish HTTP/2 Rapid Reset Attack</title><link>https://www.varnish.org/docs/security/vsv00013/</link><pubDate>Mon, 16 Mar 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://www.varnish.org/docs/security/vsv00013/</guid><description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;a id="vsv00013"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2023-44487"&gt;CVE-2023-44487&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Date: 2023-11-13&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A denial of service attack can be performed on Varnish Cache servers that
have the HTTP/2 protocol turned on. An attacker can create a large volume
of streams and immediately reset them without ever reaching the maximum
number of concurrent streams allowed for the session, causing the Varnish
server to consume unnecessary resources processing requests for which the
response will not be delivered.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This is a vulnerability of the protocol itself, HTTP/2 has no provisions
for servers to pace the creation of new streams from clients.&lt;/p&gt;</description></item><item><title>VSV00014 Varnish HTTP/2 Broke Window Attack</title><link>https://www.varnish.org/docs/security/vsv00014/</link><pubDate>Mon, 16 Mar 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://www.varnish.org/docs/security/vsv00014/</guid><description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;a id="vsv00014"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2024-30156"&gt;CVE-2024-30156&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Date: 2024-03-18&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A denial of service attack can be performed on Varnish Cacher servers that
have the HTTP/2 protocol turned on. An attacker can let the server’s HTTP/2
connection control flow window run out of credits indefinitely and prevent
progress in the processing of streams, retaining the associated resources.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2 id="versions-affected"&gt;Versions affected&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;All Varnish Cache releases with HTTP/2 support except:
&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;7.5.x releases&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;7.4.x releases after 7.4.2.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;7.3.x releases after 7.3.1.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;6.0.x LTS releases after 6.0.12&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;
&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Varnish Enterprise by Varnish Software 6.0.x up to and including 6.0.12r5.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;
&lt;h2 id="versions-not-affected"&gt;Versions not affected&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Varnish Cache 7.3.2 (released 2024-03-18)&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Varnish Cache 7.4.3 (released 2024-03-18)&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Varnish Cache 6.0 LTS version 6.0.13 (released 2024-03-18)&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Varnish Enterprise by Varnish Software version 6.0.12r6.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;
&lt;h2 id="timeline"&gt;Timeline&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;strong&gt;2019-04-19&lt;/strong&gt; the vulnerability is theorized (see commit message of &lt;a href="https://github.com/varnishcache/varnish-cache/commit/e1a1fdc7688de5f37e35fc528639019d5bd3efbf"&gt;e1a1fdc7&lt;/a&gt;)&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;strong&gt;2023-08-24&lt;/strong&gt; the vulnerability is confirmed
&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;it happened while working on bringing back the parameters &lt;code&gt;timeout_req&lt;/code&gt;
and &lt;code&gt;timeout_reqbody&lt;/code&gt; to Varnish Enterprise 6.0&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;
&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;strong&gt;2023-09-20&lt;/strong&gt; the vulnerability is studied
&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;once the timeouts are reintroduced in Varnish Enterprise, work started to
find an appropriate mitigation&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;
&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;strong&gt;2023-10-10&lt;/strong&gt; the HTTP/2 Rapid Reset Attack is disclosed
&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;work on the Rapid Reset Attack starts, see &lt;a href="https://www.varnish.org/docs/security/vsv00013/#vsv00013"&gt;VSV00013 Varnish HTTP/2 Rapid Reset Attack&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;work on the Broke Window Attack mitigation is postponed&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;
&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;strong&gt;2023-10-23&lt;/strong&gt; CVE-2023-43622 is published
&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;it describes a subset of the vulnerability for the Apache HTTP Server&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;work on the Broke Window Attack mitigation resumes&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;a first iteration is ready and submitted for a review&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;the Varnish Cache maintainers are informed&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;
&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;strong&gt;2023-11-16&lt;/strong&gt; a second iteration is submitted for review&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;strong&gt;2023-11-29&lt;/strong&gt; the second iteration is approved
&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Varnish Enterprise ships the mitigation in the 6.0.12r4 release&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;
&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;strong&gt;2023-12-05&lt;/strong&gt; the mitigation is ported to Varnish Cache
&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;the master branch is targeted&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;the mitigation is not ready to publish&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;
&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;strong&gt;2024-01-15&lt;/strong&gt; the port to Varnish Cache resumes
&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;ported to supported branches 7.4, 7.4 and 6.0 LTS&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;
&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;strong&gt;2024-01-17&lt;/strong&gt; a regression is discovered
&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;the second iteration of the mitigation is racy&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;when a race occurs, it is partially effective&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;offending HTTP/2 streams are reset, but the connection is not closed&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;
&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;strong&gt;2024-01-23&lt;/strong&gt; the regression is fixed
&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;the ports to Varnish Cache are updated&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;a bug fix is submitted to Varnish Enterprise&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;
&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;strong&gt;2024-03-05&lt;/strong&gt; the port to Varnish Cache master branch is updated&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;strong&gt;2024-03-18&lt;/strong&gt; public advisory and releases&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;
&lt;h2 id="mitigation"&gt;Mitigation&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;If upgrading Varnish is not possible, it is possible to mitigate the problem
by simply disabling HTTP/2 support:&lt;/p&gt;</description></item><item><title>VSV00015 Varnish HTTP/1 client-side desync vulnerability</title><link>https://www.varnish.org/docs/security/vsv00015/</link><pubDate>Mon, 16 Mar 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://www.varnish.org/docs/security/vsv00015/</guid><description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;a id="vsv00015"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2025-30346"&gt;CVE-2025-30346&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Date: 2025-03-18&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A client-side desync vulnerability can be triggered in Varnish Cache
and Varnish Enterprise. This vulnerability can be triggered under
specific circumstances involving malformed HTTP/1 requests.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Certain malformed HTTP/1 requests have been handled by issuing a &lt;code&gt;400 Bad Request&lt;/code&gt; response, and then allowing the connection to carry on
with a subsequent request on that same connection. For the case where
the initial malformed request contains a request body, the body is not
properly processed and is instead treated as the basis for a
subsequent request. This can result in the client receiving a response
associated with the improperly embedded request as a response to a
subsequent request.&lt;/p&gt;</description></item><item><title>VSV00016 Request Smuggling Attack</title><link>https://www.varnish.org/docs/security/vsv00016/</link><pubDate>Mon, 16 Mar 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://www.varnish.org/docs/security/vsv00016/</guid><description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;a id="vsv00016"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2025-47905"&gt;CVE-2025-47905&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Date: 2025-05-12&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A client-side desync vulnerability can be triggered in Varnish Cache
and Varnish Enterprise. This vulnerability can be triggered under
specific circumstances involving malformed HTTP/1 chunked requests.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An attacker can abuse a flaw in Varnish’s handling of chunked
transfer encoding which allows certain malformed HTTP/1 requests
to exploit improper framing of the message body to smuggle
additional requests. Specifically, Varnish incorrectly permits
CRLF to be skipped to delimit chunk boundaries.&lt;/p&gt;</description></item><item><title>VSV00017 Varnish HTTP/2 Made You Reset Attack</title><link>https://www.varnish.org/docs/security/vsv00017/</link><pubDate>Mon, 16 Mar 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://www.varnish.org/docs/security/vsv00017/</guid><description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;a id="vsv00017"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2025-8671"&gt;CVE-2025-8671&lt;/a&gt;
&lt;a href="https://kb.cert.org/vuls/id/767506"&gt;VU#767506&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Date: 2025-08-13&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A denial of service attack can be performed on Varnish Cache servers that
have the HTTP/2 protocol turned on. An attacker can create a large number
of streams and immediately reset them without ever reaching the maximum
number of concurrent streams allowed for the session, causing the Varnish
server to consume unnecessary resources processing requests for which the
response will not be delivered.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This attack is a variant of the HTTP/2 Rapid Reset Attack, which was
handled as &lt;a href="https://www.varnish.org/docs/security/vsv00013/#vsv00013"&gt;VSV00013&lt;/a&gt;. The countermeasure put in place for
&lt;a href="https://www.varnish.org/docs/security/vsv00013/#vsv00013"&gt;VSV00013&lt;/a&gt; was to implement a rate limit on the number of
stream resets allowed before the session would be closed by the Varnish
server. The new variant of the attack bypasses this rate limit by
executing a benign protocol violation, causing the stream to be reset by
the server rather than by the client. This would effectively bypass the
rate limit, reopening the attack vector.&lt;/p&gt;</description></item><item><title>VSV00018 Varnish Cache absolute form parsing deficiency</title><link>https://www.varnish.org/docs/security/vsv00018/</link><pubDate>Mon, 16 Mar 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://www.varnish.org/docs/security/vsv00018/</guid><description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;a id="vsv00018"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;CVE: pending&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Date: 2026-03-16&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A deficiency in HTTP/1.1 request parsing can potentially be used for cache
poisoning or authentication bypass, if the &lt;code&gt;req.url&lt;/code&gt; VCL variable gets passed
unchecked to a backend which accepts requests with absolute form URIs.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The potential attack surface of this issue is limited to &amp;ldquo;root&amp;rdquo; URLs with a path
of &lt;code&gt;/&lt;/code&gt; as in &lt;code&gt;https://example.com/&lt;/code&gt;, but not &lt;code&gt;https://example.com/whatever&lt;/code&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;We recommend upgrading to a version which is not affected, or mitigating the issue
in VCL, as detailed below.&lt;/p&gt;</description></item></channel></rss>